Abstract. We deal with soft model theory of infinitary logics. We find a logic between L ∞,ℵ 0 and L∞,∞ which has some striking properties. First, it has interpolations (it was known that each of those logics fail interpolation though the pair has). Second, well ordering is not characterized in a strong way. Third, it can be characterized as the maximal such nice logic (in fact, is the maximal logic stronger than L ∞,ℵ 0 and which satisfies "well ordering is not characterized in a strong way").
§ 0. Introduction for non-logicians
The first part of the introduction urged to try to explain the aim to general mathematical audience, so may be skipped by a knowledgeable reader; naturally we should start by explaining what is first order logic and a general (abstract) logic from model theoretic perspective.
We may consider classes of rings, and classes of groups but usually we do not consider a class containing structures of both kinds. Formally a ring is a structure (or model) M consistent of its universe, set of elements called |M | (but we may write a ∈ M ) and interpretations + M , × M and 0 M of the binary function symbols +, × and the individual consistent symbol (= zero place function symbol) 0. We also write n M for {(a 0 , . . . , a n−1 ) : a 0 , . . . , a n−1 an element of M }. Generally we have a so-called vocabulary τ consisting of relation symbols (= predicates) and function symbol, each with a given a number of places (= arity).
For a ring M we many times consider the set of n-tuples satisfying some equations. Model theorist usually look at a wider class of such sets, which start with the family {{ā ∈ n M :ā satisfies an equation ϕ} : n ∈ N and ϕ an equation} and close it under intersection of two (with the same n) compliment inside the relevant n (M ) and projection (from n+1 M to n M ). So a first order formula for the vocabulary τ, ϕ = ϕ(x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) is a scheme giving for a τ -structure M a subset ϕ(M ) of n M as above. If n = 0, ϕ(M ) ∈ {{ }, ∅} then we call ϕ a sentence and say M satisfifes it, M |= ϕ iff ϕ(M ) = ∅; let L(τ ) be the set of first order sentences or formulas in the vocabulary τ ; as we can add additional individual constants the difference is minor. We may consider sets definable with parameters by, i.e. There is much to be said for first order logic; e.g. for this family of subsets of n M for n ∈ N has better closure properties than the set "solutions of finitely many equations", i.e. varieties; however we shall not say it here. But in first order logic we cannot express, e.g. "a group G is locally finite, i.e. every finitely generated subgroup is finite". To express this we may allow: if ϕ k (x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) is a formulas for k ∈ N then so is ϕ(x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) = k ϕ k (x 0 , . . . , x k ), i.e. ϕ(M ) = ∩{ϕ k (M ) :
k}.
Allowing this we get the logic L ℵ1,ℵ0 , more generally ⊞ 0 the logic L λ,κ is defined similarly but the formulas have the form ϕ = ϕ( x i : i < γ ), γ < κ and we allow α<β ϕ α (x) for β < λ and (∃x 0 , . . . , x α , . . .)ϕ(x,ȳ)
where we allow a formula to have < κ free variables, i.e. we consider subsets of α M for α < κ.
Another strengthening of first order logic is allowing ψ(ȳ) = (∃ ≥ℵ1 xϕ(x,ȳ), i.e. ψ(M ) = {b: for uncountably many a ∈ M we have M |= ϕ[b,ā]}. There are many other logics. Now first order logic has many good properties, including (recall, the cardinality of a set A is the number of elements, which may be infinite, the cardinality of a model is the number of its element, i.e. the cardinality of its universe M ) ⊞ 1 the downward LST (Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski) property:
(a) if a sentence ψ ∈ L(τ ) has a model, i.e. M |= ψ then it has a countable model This means that first order logic does not distinguish infinite cardinals.
⊞ 2 compactness: if T is a set of sentences in L(τ ) and every finite T ′ ⊆ T has a model, i.e. for some τ -model M we have ϕ ∈ T ′ ⇒ M |= ϕ then T has a model.
The desirability of this should be obvious.
⊞ 3 interpolation: if τ 0 = τ 1 ∩ τ 2 are vocabularies, ψ 1 ∈ L(τ 1 ), ψ 2 ∈ L(τ 2 ) and ψ 1 ⊢ ψ 2 , i.e. there is no model of ψ 1 ∧ ¬ψ 2 , (equivalently if M is a (τ 1 ∪ τ 2 )-model and M |= ψ 1 then M |= ψ), then there is ϕ ∈ L(τ 0 ) such that ψ 1 ⊢ ϕ and ϕ ⊢ ϕ 2 .
First order logic satisfies interpolation: this is Craig theorem. Lindström set out to show that first order logic is the natural choice, recalling there are many logics; for this he has first to define a logic, essentially (see more in Definition 1.9)
⊞ 4 a logic L consists of the following (a) a set of sentences L (τ ) for any vocabulary τ , we can define formulas ϕ(x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) by adding to τ individual constants (b) satisfaction relation |= L , i.e. M |= L ψ where M a model, ψ ∈ L (τ M ) (c) natural properties like preservation under isomorphisms and monotonicity (i.e. τ 1 ⊆ τ 2 ⇒ L (τ 1 ) ⊆ L (τ 2 )).
This seems too wide so (see more in Definition 1.12).
⊞ 5 L is a nice logic if the sets of sentences L (τ ) has some natural closure properties like:
• if ψ 1 , ψ 2 ∈ L (τ ) then for some ψ ∈ L (τ ) we have: M |= ψ iff M |= ψ 1 and M |= ψ 2 .
There is a natural order on the class of logics:
⊞ 6 L 1 ≤ L 2 iff for every vocabulary τ and ψ 2 ∈ L 1 (τ ) there is ψ 2 ∈ L 2 (τ ) such that: if M is a τ -model then This indicates that the family of nice logics not equivalent to L is the union of:
• the infinitary ones, usually above L ℵ1,ℵ0
• the somewhat compact, usually ℵ 0 -compact ones.
We here deal with the first. Lindström theorem founded "abstract model theory" where we have variables over logics. In the seventies and eighties this area flourished but a reason for its almost dying out is the lack of similar theorems for other logics, i.e. discovering (or pointing out) "interesting" logic which can be characterized in a reasonable way.
The aim of this work is to present such an infinitary logic and prove that it has some desirable properties. In particular it satifies interpolation which holds only in "few" cases. This solves some more specific old problems and we hope it will reopen the case of "abstract model theory".
In more details, consider the logic is L 1 κ for any suitable cardinal κ playing the role of ℵ 0 in first order logic ⊞ L 1 κ satisfies (a) a downward LST; any sentence which has a model, has one of cardinality < κ (b) if the vocabulary has cardinality < κ then the number of sentences is κ (c) a weak substitute of compactness: well ordering is not definable; (d) the L 1 κ -theory of a product of two τ -models M 1 × M 2 depend just on the L 1 κ -theories of M 1 and M 2 (e) interpolation, see ⊞ 3 . § 1. Introduction and preliminaries § 1(A). Aims.
We feel that this is an important one among my work and will attract little attention. Is this an oxymoron? We do not think so. See below.
The investigation of model theoretic logics and soft model theory has started with Lindström theorems and it was a central topic of model theory in the seventies. Major aims were to find characterization theorems, new important logics and non-trivial implications. The achievements were to a large extent summed up in the handbook Barwise-Feferman [Be85] but then the subject become quite muted. There were some external reasons: stability theory and theoretical computer science draw people away and there were also some incidental personal reasons. But probably the profound reason was a disappointment. The impression was that there were just too many examples and counterexamples but not enough deep results and, particularly, too many logics and too few characterization theorems (saying a logic L is the unique logic such that ...). Recall that Lindström characterize first order logic; e.g. as the only "reasonable" logic satisfying compactness (for ℵ 0 sentences) and the downward LST theorem (for one sentence, to ℵ 0 ), (but see §(1D) below). Still there was some activity later, particularly of Väänänen.
Here we try to reopen the case. A property which remains mysterious was interpolation, see Makowsky [Mak85] in the handbook. It was known that
has interpolation, a puzzling result. This leads naturally to a question: does this interpolation come from the existence of an intermediate logic which has interpolation? See more on the history of those questions and on interpolation and related subjects, [Mak85] ;
Let us recall some old questions on which we do not advance here. Feferman raises the question Question 1.1. Is there an ℵ 0 -compact logic strenghtening L(∃ ≥ℵ1 ) with interpolation.
Note the plethora of extensions of L(∃ ≥ℵ1 ). For my taste preferably Question 1.2. 1) Is there a λ-compact logic stronger than first order satisfying interpolation, for any λ? 2) Moreover, fully compact one? Of course, part (2) becomes a question only after fully compact logics > L were discovered ([Sh:18]).
The introduction of [Be85] mentions the (then latest advance): some compact logic strengthening first order logic satisfies the Beth definability theorem, ([Sh:199]) a puzzling result. Also the pair (L(Q cf ℵ0 ), L(aa)) of logics satisfies interpolation. Again a puzzling result. Those cases give place to hope of better results using related new logics. Returning to infinitary logics, old problems are (and will be our main concern):
Later we have asked ourselves: Problem 1.5. Is there, for arbitrarily large cardinal κ, a logic L such that:
(a) L κ,ω ⊆ L and has reasonable closure properties (b) L has the downward LST property in the sense that every sentence which has a model N , has a model N of "small" cardinality, moreover M ⊆ N (c) L has interpolation (d) undefinability of well ordering (in a strong sense) which means: if M expands (H (λ), ∈) and M |= ψ then for some N we have (α) N |= ψ (β) ord N is not well founded a posteriori we add (γ) |N | is the union of ℵ 0 , an internal set of bounded cardinality, i.e. for some a n : n < ω , θ, N |= "θ a cardinal such that |a n | ≤ θ and
Problem 1.6. Is there a maximal such logic? There is a feeling that Lindström theorem, EF-games and interpolation are inherently connected, though I do not know of a formlization of it, the present work gives evidence strengthening this feeling. § 1(B). What is achieved.
We feel that here we reasonably fulfill those old hopes mentioned above, in the direction of non-compact logics; (recall that by Lindstrom theorem any (nice) logic stronger than first order logic, fail downward LST to ℵ 0 or fail ℵ 0 -compactness).
Assume for transparency κ = κ , we find an interesting logic, L 1 κ such that:
κ is a nice logic (B) it has a reasonable characterization: it is the maximal nice logic, see Definition 1.9, 1.12 such that (α, <) can be characterized up to isomorphism by some ψ α ∈ L 1 κ for α < κ, has occurance number ≤ κ, see Definition 1.11 and well ordering is not definable in a strong way (C) it satisfies interpolation 2 (see ⊞ 3 above or Definition 1.14 below; answering an old question on the existence of such logic) (D) it is between L −1 <κ = ∪{L λ + ,ℵ0 : λ < κ} and L 0 <κ = ∪{L λ + ,λ + : λ < κ}, see ⊞ 0 above or Definition 1.20 below (E) has many of the good properties of L
has a model of cardinality < κ (see some variants in Definition 2.14 below) 2 for consequences of interpolation, see [Mak85] (β) well ordering is not an expressible 3 (γ) addition of theories, see 3.14 (δ) product of (two) theories, see 3.14 (F ) alternative characterization: L 1 κ is a minimal nice logic L for which • for any ordinal α < κ we can characterize (α, <) up to isomorphism by some ψ α ∈ L • we can characterize the class of (A ∪ P, A, ∈)
where
≤µ is an ℵ 0 -cover (and A ∩ P = ∅) for each µ < κ by some sentence from L (see Definition 3.6) • L is ∆-closed, see Definition 3.8 • L has occurance number ≤ κ, see Definition 1.11.
We do not have a generalization of the Feferman-Vaught theorem [FV59] on general operations and even not the Mostowski one, [Mos52] , on reduced products, even for the product of countably many models, see Theorem 4.10.
Here in §2 we choose a definition of the logic closest to the way we arrive to it and to the proof. For α, θ < κ we generalize the Ehrenfuecht-Fraisse game allowing "rescheduling of debts". This does not give an equivalence relation so we close the induced relation to an equivalence relation and a sentence, i.e. the class of models of a sentence is the union of some such equivalence classes; then we prove the basic properties.
In §3 we deal with the deeper properties as promised in ⊛ 1 above: non-definability of well ordering, characterization and interpolation.
In §4 we show how close is our logic to L 0 κ and deal with sums and products. We intend to continue in [Sh:F1046], in particular concerning to 1.4.
More than once, lecturing on this some in the audience "complain" that this definition does not sound like a definition of logic. So in [Sh:F1046] we intend to give presentation close to the ways logic are traditionally defined (we could have done it for L 1 κ , too) but our characterization theorem shows that we shall get the same logic.
The logic L 1 κ from §1 is quite satisfactory; many of the good properties of L <κ,ℵ0 and interpolation, and a characterization (parallel to Lindström theorem). But compared to L <κ,ℵ0 we lose the upward LST. ⊛ 2 (a) per se, uniqueness results are nice, of course (b) historically -Lindström theorem has this form (c) they prove a logic is natural logic (d) for a logic which lacks such theorem we may well suspect that 3 That is, if ψ is a sentence and for every ordinal α for some M, M |= ψ and (P M , < M ) is a well ordering of order type ≥ α then for some model M of ψ, (P M , < M ) is not a well ordering.
• there are many relatives of similar good properties, without a special reason to prefer one or another.
How good is a characterization theorem? Of course, it all depends on the properties appearing in the characterization being natural and preferably well established. The situation of having reasonable logics which we can strengthen preseving their main positive properties but neither seeing a maximal one nor proving such extension do not exist has been prominent in the area; e.g. the most well established ones like L(Q) = L(∃ ≥ℵ1 ) and also L κ + ,ℵ0 . Why here we tend to look at strong limit cardinals, in particular, κ = κ ? Note that in first order formula with a fix finite vocabulary, with predicates only for transparency the number of sentences of quantifier depth q has order of magnitude q , iterated power q times. In infinitary logic, if we like that still there is a sentence expressing the "quantifier depth ≤ α theory" we need κ = κ . A price is that for κ singular, we lose full substitution, and moreover, full closure under conjunctions of < κ. This is resolved if we demand κ is strong limit regular, i.e. (strongly) inaccessible, fine but the existence of such cardinals is unprovable in ZFC. § 1(D). Directions ignored here. We do not deal here with some other major directions:
(b) logics without negation and continuous logic (c) almost isomorphism (and absolute logic).
We may look at model theory essentially replacing "isomorphic" by "almost isomorphic", that is isomorphisms by potential isomorphisms, i.e. isomorphism in some forcing extension. In [Sh:12] we have suggested to reconsider a major theme in model theory, counting the number of isomorphism types. We call M, N almostisomorphic when M, N have (the same vocabulary and) the same L ∞,ℵ0 -theory, equivalently isomorphic in some generic extension. For a theory What about applications of soft model theory? There are some applications using compact logics. See [Sh:384] on extending first order logic by second order quantifiers restricted in some ways. Of course, the expressive power of the logic depend on the restriction, see the example below. In cofinality logic, L(Q cf C ) with C is a class of regular cardinals, we are allowed to say: the formula ϕ(x, y), possibly with parameters, define a linear order with no last element of cofinality from C, recalling that the cofinality of a linear oder I is the minimal cardinality of an unbounded (equivalently cofinal) subset. If C is non-trivial, this logic is a very interesting logic (e.g. fully compact), in particular showing what we cannot prove so full compactness is not sufficient to characterize first order logic. But its expressive power is weak so we do not expect it to have applications.
In [Sh:384] (where you can find something about the history of the topic) we prove the compactness of the quantifier (that is for first order logic extended by it) L ceab = L(Q ceab ) -quantifying over complete embeddings of one atomless Boolean ring into another. Moreover, for this logic we prove completeness for a natural set of axioms. Now consider the problem "can the automorphism groups of a 1-homogeneous 4 Boolean algebra be non-simple 5 "? Much is known on this group and, in particular, that it is "almost" simple -see Rubin-Stepanek [Rv89] . It was known that there may exist such Boolean Algebras as by [Sh:b, IV] in some generic extension, all automorphisms of P(ω)/finite are trivial (i.e. induced by permutations π of Z such that {n ∈ Z : n ≥ 0 but π(n) < 0} is finite) and van Dowen note that the group of trivial automorphisms of P(ω)/finite is not simple (as the subgoup of the automorphisms induced by permutations of ω is a normal subgroup) and the quotient is isomorphic to (Z, +). Alternatively, Koppelberg [Kop85] has directly constructed such Boolean Algebras of cardinality ℵ 1 assuming (the more natural assumption) CH. So by the completeness theorem (as the set of axioms is absolute), as the relevant facts are expressible in L(Q ceab ), the existence is proved in ZFC. Some may want to consider a direct proof. It almost certainly will give more specific desirable information.
Another helpful quantifier is on branches of trees (see [Sh:72] ). In Fuchs-Shelah [FuSh:766] it is used to eliminate the use of diamond, i.e. to prove in ZFC the existence of valuation domains R such that there are R-modules which are univerasl (i.e. the family of sub-modules is linearly ordered by inclusion) but not standard. Note the obvious examples (which are called standard): R itself or appropriate quotients. Actually the completeness theorem for this logic gives an absoluteness result which is used.
We believe that quantifiers with completeness and compactness will be useful so it is worthwhile to find such quantifiers. Hopefully see more in [Sh:800]. * * * § 1(F). Preliminaries.
Notation 1.8. 1) τ denotes a vocabulary, i.e. a set of predicates so each P ∈ τ has arity τ (P ) < ω places and each function symbol F ∈ τ has arity τ (F ) < ω places; of course, individual constants are zero-place function symbols and we may write arity(P ), arity(F ) when τ is clear from the context. 1A) For a structure M let τ M be the vocabulary of M , for a predicate P from τ M , P M is the interpretation of P so an arity τ (P )-place relation on |M |, the universe of M ; similarly for a function symbol F from τ and in particular for an individual constant c from τ .
4 A Boolean algebra B is 1-homogeneous if it is atomless for every a, b ∈ B \ {0 B } we have
5 That is has no normal subgroup which is neither the full group nor the one-element sub-group 2) L denotes a logic, see Definition 1.9.
3)x,ȳ,z denote sequence of variables (with no repetition). Usuallyx = x i : i < α so α = ℓg(ᾱ) but even possiblyx = x s : s ∈ S and then we let ℓg(x) = S. 4) We say τ is a relational vocabulary when it has no function symbol.
Recall
Definition 1.9. 1) A logic L consists of (a) function τ → L (τ ) giving a set of sentences ϕ (or formulas ϕ(x), see 1.10 below) for any vocabulary τ ; the function is a class function that is a definition
when π is an isomorphism from the vocabulary τ 1 onto the vocabulary τ 2 (i.e. if P ∈ τ 1 ⇒ then π(P ) ∈ τ 2 is a predicate and arity τ1 (P ) = arity τ2 (π(P )) and similarly for F ∈ τ 1 ) (d) if π is an isomorphism from the vocabulary τ 1 onto the vocabulary τ 2 and M 1 is a τ 1 -model and
τ ′ ⊆ τ is of cardinality < κ} for any vocabulary τ . Definition 1.12. We say a logic L is nice when:
(a) (α) applying predicates: if P ∈ τ is an n-place predicate then
(γ) applying 6 functions: for an n-place function symbol F ∈ τ ,
where P ∈ τ is a unary predicate, and τ is a relational vocabulary, see Definition 1.15, 1.8(4), (but see clause (d)(γ) below) (d) weak substitution, that is, has substitution for very simple schemes, see 1.17 below.
Remark 1.13. 1) Above we prefer (a)(γ) on using R ′ (σ 0 , . . . , σ m−1 ) where each
2) Below we can define the multi-sort vesrion.
Definition 1.14. 1) A logic L satisfies interpolation when for any sentence
2) Naturally definition for multi-sort languages.
Definition 1.15. 1) We say ϕ ≡ ψ↾P where ϕ, ψ ∈ L (τ ) or pedantically 7 ϕ = ψ↾ τ P where P is a unary predicate in the vocabulary τ, τ is of minimal cardinality such that ψ ∈ L (τ ) when :
for any τ -models M, M |= (ψ↾ τ P ) iff P M is non-empty, closed under F M for every function symbol from τ and M ↾P M |= ψ, see below. 2) For a τ -model M and unary predicate P let N = M ↾τ be the τ -model with universe P M , for n-place predicate Q ∈ τ we have
2A) Above we say the ((L 1 , τ 1 , τ 2 )-interpretation) schemeθ is simple when ϑ x0=x1 has the form (x 0 = x 1 ).
7 of course ψ↾τ is not uniquely determined. We may like to be more liberal in restricting a model, in 1.8(1) allow F M to be a partial function for F a function symbol from τ (M ). We may combine this with restriction (see Definition 1.15), then we still have to demand P M = ∅ (except if we go further and allow empty models). Note M |= "¬F (ā) = b" when F M (ā) is not well defined.
3) Forθ as above we say
} is an equivalence relation on |M | or just some non-empty subset
(note: not for every suchθ and τ 1 -model M 1 is Nθ[M 2 ] well defined, we need that ϕ = (−, −) defines an equivalence relation on |M 1 |, which is a congruence relation for the τ 2 -relations and functions we define and, of course, the definition of functions gives ones, similarly below; but if ϑ is simple this problem does not arise). 4) We say the logic L satisfies full substitution 8 when: if τ 1 , τ 2 are vocabularies,
We say that the logic L satisfies substitution when we requireθ to be simple. Definition 1.17. 1) We sayθ is a weak (L , τ 1 , τ 2 )-scheme (but L is immaterial so can be omitted) when :
are atomic (on conjunction of two atomic for equality)
formulas in which we substitute some variables by individual constants, moreover:
2) We say L has weak substitution when as in Definition 1.16(4), but restricting ourselves to weak schemes.
Remark 1.18. 1) The meaning of 1.17(1)(c)(γ) is
•c F a sequence of individual constants from or ( * ) 2 similarly using Q ′ F (x 0 , . . . , x n ,c F ). 8 We do not use full substitution; as for κ singular L 0 κ , L 1 κ are not closed under full substitution 2) Why in 1.17(1)(c) the "moreover", i.e. why is the second version stronger? As we demand thec ϕ 's to be as in the end. Does not matter whether we ask it or not. We could further demandc ϕ = c * for allφ ∈ at(τ 2 ).
3) In "weak (L , τ 1 , τ 2 )-scheme" (hence in "weak substitution") we may use first order formulas (instead of atomic), i.e. that is our results will not be affected by this change in the definition. 4) Also, in "weak(L , τ 1 , τ 2 )-scheme" we may addc ϕ = c * , for one c * , and/or demandθ is simple. For the later change in the proof of 3.4, we have to say that "without loss of generality all M α,n have cardinality ≥ µ 1 and in fact = µ 1 ", for this we need claim version of LST, see so have to add the assumption "L satisfies suitable version of LST.
is the closure of the set of atomic formulas under ¬ϕ, i<α ϕ i where α < κ and (∀x 0 , . . . , x i , . . .) i<α ϕ where α < θ; a sentence is a formula with no free variables and satisfaction is defined naturally.
We define the logic L ∞,θ,γ by induction on the ordinal γ such that L ∞,θ,γ (τ ) is a set of cardinality ≤ γ (|τ | + ℵ 0 ), increasing with γ as follows:
• for γ = 0, the set of basic sentences • for γ limit, it is ∪{L ∞,θ,β (τ ) : β < γ} • for γ = β + 1 it is the set of sentences of the form (∃x)
Observation 1.21. If κ is strong limit singular, then there is no logic L such that:
Note that (A) The moves are indexed by n < ω (but every actual play is finite), just before the n-th move we have a state
(f ) g preserves satisfaction of the formulas in Γ and their negations, i.e. and g s ⊆ g t , β s > β t , n s < n t ; we say t is a successor of s if in addition n t = n s + 1 (E) in the n-th move the anti-isomorphism player (AIS) chooses (β n+1 , ι n , A ′ n ) such that:
≤θ , the isomorphism player (ISO) chooses a state s n+1 such that • s n+1 is a successor of s n
• the play ends when one of the player has no legal moves (always occur as β n < β n−1 ) and then this player loses, this may occur for n = 0
• for α = 0 we stipulate that ISO wins iff s 0 α is a state.
Discussion 2.2. 1) This is a parallel to EF-games. Note that we like on the one hand the game to have ≤ ω moves, really each play has < ω moves and deal with sets of cardinality ≤ θ and on the other hand we do not like well ordering to be definable, i.e. allow M 1 to be well ordered while M 2 to be non-well ordered but still the ISO player wins. We do this by "rescheduling our debts", i.e. using the h n 's.
Γ,θ,α is reflexive and symmetric.
3) The relation E 1 Γ,θ,α is an equivalence relation on the class of τ -models. 4) If α is a limit ordinal then Definition 2.5. We define the logic L 1 ≤θ as follows: a sentence ψ ∈ L ≤θ (τ ) iff the sentence is defined using (or by) a triple (qf(τ 1 ), θ, α) which means: τ 1 a subvocabulary of τ of cardinality ≤ θ and α < θ + and for some sequence M α : α < α( * ) of τ 1 -models of length α( * )
κ (τ ) has infinitely many free variables, we cannot "close" it to a sentence. 3) We may instead define L 1, * ≤θ by: ψ ∈ L 1 ≤θ (τ ) iff for some τ ′ ⊆ τ of cardinality ≤ θ and some sequence M i : i < i( * ) of τ ′ -models of cardinality ≤ 2 θ and some Just note that if ϕ ℓ is defined using (qf(τ ℓ ), θ ℓ , α ℓ ) and τ = τ 1 ∪τ 2 , θ = max{θ 1 , θ 2 }, α = max{α 1 , α 2 } then the equivalence relation E 1 qf(τ ),θ,α refine the equivalence relation E
is defined by the triple (qf(τ ∪ {c}), θ, α) and ϕ(x) is the corresponding formula L 1 κ (τ ) and ∃xϕ(x) is the naturally defined sentence. Now if M 1 , M 2 are E 0 qf(τ ),θ,α+1 -equivalent τ -models then M 1 |= ∃xϕ(x) iff M 2 |= (∃x)ϕ(x) by the definition of the game. Hence this holds for "M 1 , M 2 are E 1 qf(τ ),θ,α+1 -equivalent τ -models".
Clause (b)(γ): Negation
Obvious by the definition because for any vocabulary τ of cardinality ≤ θ the equivalence relation E 1 qf(τ ),θ,α has ≤ α+1 (θ) equivalence classes by 2.4(5).
Clause (c): Restricting to a unary predicate P
Easily if ψ is defined using (qf(τ ), θ, α) and without loss of generality P ∈ τ then so is ψ↾P . Clause (d): We prove more: Full substitution:
Assume we are given vocabularies τ 1 , τ 2 and consider substituting ϕ P (x 0 , . . . , x arity τ 2 (P )−1 ) ∈ L 1 ≤θ (τ 0 ) for P ∈ τ 2 treating F (x 0 , . . . , x arity(F )−1 ) = x arity(F ) as an (arity τ2(F )+1 )-place predicate. Let ϕ P be defined by (qf(τ +arity(P ) ), θ P , α P ) and let α 0 = sup{α P : P ∈ τ 2 }.
We are given ψ ∈ L 1 ≤θ (τ 1 ) and we shall find ψ ′ ∈ L 1 ≤θ (τ 2 ) which says that if we substitute ϕ P (x 0 , . . . , x arity τ 2 (P ) ) instead P (x 0 , . . .) in ψ for every P ∈ τ 1 , we get (up to equivalence) ψ ′ . Let ψ be defined by (qf(τ 1 ), θ 1 , α 1 ). Let α 2 = α 1 + α 0 and easily there is ψ ′ as required defined by (qf(τ 2 ), θ 1 , α 2 ).
2.7
Claim 2.8.
≤θ is equivalent to, hence can be looked at, as a formula of
Remark 2.9. For many purposes we identify them, i.e. say L Proof. 1) We first prove: [Why? We prove this by induction on β. First, for β = 0 this is trivial as s is a state. Second, for β limit, any choice of the AIS player includes an ordinal γ = β ns+1 < β, so the ISO player may "pretend" that the given state s has β s = γ + 1 and use the induction hypothesis. Third, if β = γ + 1, let the AIS player make his choice (β ns+1 , ι, A). Now ISO has to extend g ι s adding some ≤ θ elements of M ι to its domain, the elements in {a ∈ Dom(g ι s ) : h ι s (a) < n s + 1} ∪ A, letb ι list them. Letx = x ε : ε < ε( * ) and letȳ = y ε : ε < ℓg(b ι ) and define
Now the player ISO can make its move getting the state t, a successor of s such that g t = g s ∪ { b 1 ε , b 2 ε : ε < ℓg(ȳ) , g t mapsb 1 tob 2 and n t = n s + 1 and β t = γ; clearly possible. As the ordinal β ns+1 chosen by the AIS is ≤ γ also t is as required in ⊞ 1 but so, by the induction hypothesis also it is a winning state.] Let 2.8
Remark 2.10. 1) The proof above may seem wasteful but for our purposes this is immaterial.
2) We can do better as follows, i.e. another proof of 2.8 runs as follows: By induction on the formula. Without loss of generality we deal with a formula Θ N,d,θ,α,Γ (x) by induction on β ≤ α we prove: The proof is straightforward. 
The case s = s 0 β , the initial state, suffice to prove the desired result. First Case: β = 0.
Trivial.
Second Case: β a limit ordinal. If the AIS makes its move choosing (A, ι, β 1 ), the ISO player may pretend β s = β + 1 and use the induction hypothesis, this is O.K. as β < β + 1, as in proving 2.8.
Third Case: β = γ + 1.
As in the proof of 2.8.
2.11
We can sum up the easy properties but first we present two definitions. 2) L 1 κ is a nice logic and if κ is regular (equivalently strongly inaccessible) then it has full subsitution. First we prove a strong form of non-definability of well ordering.
Claim 3.1. Let κ = κ so a strong limit cardinal. 1) Property (d) of Problem 1.5 holds.
2) Moreover, if (A) then (B) where τ is a vocabulary to which the predicates P, <, R (unary, binary, binary) belongs and:
≤µ or just the former family is cofinal in the latter family (both ordered by inclusion) (B) there are a τ -model N and a sequence b n : n < ω such that:
Proof. 1) Follows by (2).
2) Without loss of generality |M | is an ordinal, P M = (2 µ ) + and < M is the usual order of the ordinals on |M |. By induction on n we choose a sequence (M n,γ ,β n,γ ,b n,γ ) : γ < (2 µ ) + such that ⊞ 1 (a)β n,γ = β n,γ,ℓ : ℓ < n is a decreasing sequence of ordinals from P M , which are > γ andb n,γ = b n,γ,ℓ : ℓ < n is a sequence of members of M
,β n,γ2 ), note that the isomorphism is unique as < M is a well ordering and necessarily the isomorphism maps b n,γ1,ℓ to b n,γ2,ℓ and β n,γ1,ℓ to β n,γ2,ℓ for ℓ < n
+ is as required. Having carried the induction, it is easy to find models N n and elements a ℓ , b ℓ for ℓ < n by induction on n < ω such that:
Now easily by 2.11 the model N = n N n and the sequenceb = b n : n < ω are as required in clause (B) with a n : n < ω witnessing clause (β) of clause (B).
3.1
Conclusion 3.2. For κ = κ , the logic L 1 κ satisfies: SUDWO 1 κ (strong undefinability of well ordering) which means: if ψ ∈ L 1 κ (τ ), |τ | < κ and <, R are two place predicates from τ then for every large enough µ 1 < κ for arbitrarily large enough µ 2 < κ we have:
⊛ if λ > µ 2 and A is a τ -expansion of (H (λ), ∈, µ 1 , µ 2 , <) with < the order on the ordinals and R A being ∈, that is ∈ ↾H (λ) then we can find B, a n , d n (for n < ω) such that (a) B |= ψ ⇔ M |= ψ (b) B |= "d n+1 < d n < µ 2 " for n < ω (c) B |= "a n ⊆ a n+1 has cardinality ≤ µ 1 " (d) if e ∈ B then B |= "e ∈ a n " for some n we may add (d) + if e ∈ B and B |= "|e| ≤ µ 1 " then B |= "e ⊆ a n " for some n.
Remark 3.3. There are other variants. At the moment the distinction is not crucial.
Proof. By 3.1.
3.6
κ (i.e. for any vocabulary τ, . . .) when :
Remark 3.5. 1) We could add the downward LST and restrict somewhat SUDWO κ . 2) As L 1 κ satisfies the demands (by 2.15) we can rephrase Theorem 3.4 as: L is ≤-maximal such that (a)-(e) holds.
Proof. Assume toward contradiction that ψ * ∈ L (τ ) is a sentence which is not equivalent to any sentence of L 1 κ (τ ). As the occurance number of L is ≤ κ by clause (c) of the assumption, without loss of generality the vocabulary τ has cardinality < Υ ≤ κ. Similarly by L being a logic, using clauses (c),(d) of Definition 1.9, without loss of generality the symbols we add to τ in ( * ) 3 (a) below do not belong to τ . We shall derive another sentence ψ * * in a somewhat bigger vocabulary, and let (µ 1 , µ 2 ) be as in Definition 3.6 for ψ * * and µ 1 ≥ θ * . Let ( * ) 0 (a) {P i : i < i( * )} list the predicates in τ (b) {H j : j < j( * )} list the function symbols in τ (c) let the vocabulary τ 1 be • the set of predicates {P
is well defined, and has < θ(α) + equivalence classes say
By the definition of
, for each such pair (α, ε) there is a sentence ϑ α,ε ∈ L 1 ≤θ(α) (τ ) which define N α,ε /E 1 qf(τ ),θ(α),α and moreover for every u ⊆ ε α the sentence ϑ α,u = ∨{ϑ α,ε : ε ∈ u} belongs to L 1 κ (τ ), i.e. up to equivalence. Hence by our assumption toward contradiction for some ζ(α) < ε α there are
By the definition of E 1 qf(τ ),θ(α),θ there is a sequenceM α such that
Without loss of generality the universes of the models M α,k (α < κ, k < ω) are pairwise disjoint and τ ⊆ H <ℵ0 (|τ |). For large enough λ we have M α,k : k ≤ k(α) : α < κ ∈ H (λ) for every α < κ and so λ > κ; let A λ = A(λ) be a model such that:
with c α individual constants, F 1 , F 2 unary function symbols, <, E binary predicates
, (α < θ * ) will be κ, θ * , θ + * , µ 1 , µ 2 , τ, τ 1 and every symbol in τ and α ≤ θ * ⇒ c θ * +α (A) = α; so c
is the order on the ordinals
is an equivalence relation such that the equivalence classes of E A are {|M α,k | : α < κ and k < ω}
is an (arity τ (H j ) + 1)-place function satisfying
(ā) for j < j( * ), α < κ and k < ω.
Let ψ * * says:
( * ) 5 (a) one first order sentence saying all relevant (set-theoretic) properties Now for each k < k( * ) by induction on n < ω we choose s n,k ∈ B such that:
( * ) 9 (a) B |= "s n,k = s 0,k , . . . , s n,k is an initial segment of a play of the game
,k+1 ]" (b) B |= "in this initial segment s n,k the ISO player uses his winning strategy st k " (c) the AIS player chooses:
(α) if n is even then ι n = 1 and
and B |= "eRa n " (β) if n is odd then ι n = 2 and A ′ n = {e ∈ B : e ∈ M B d0,k+1 and B |= "eRa n "} (γ) the "ordinal" β s n,k = d n+1 .
This can be done and g k = {(a 1 , a 2 ): for some n we have B |= "g s n,k n (a 1 ) = a 2 "}, it is an isomorphism from M Definition 3.6. Let Θ θ,R be the sentence (for R a binary predicate) such that
it is a family of subsets of Dom(R) = {a :
≤θ is included in the union of countably many such sets.
Proof. 1) By (2). 2) Toward contradiction, assume this fails; and without loss of generality M 1 E 0 qf({R}),θ + ,ω+ω+1 M 2 . By symmetry, without loss of generality assume M 2 |= Θ θ,R but M 1 |= ¬Θ θ,R . We simulate a play of the game qf({R}),θ + ,ω+ω+1 (M 1 , M 2 ) in which the ISO player uses a (fixed) winning strategy st. In the first move we let the AIS player choose β s1 = ω + ω and choose
≤θ , see above. Let the ISO player (using st) complete the choice of the state s 1 (which is a winning state for itself, of course).
Let n( * ) be minimal such that:
is not included in a countable union of sets from {{a : aR M1 b} : b ∈ B}.
By the case assumption, n( * ) is well defined. In the following n( * )−2 moves, the AIS player takes care that β s2 = ω + n( * ), . . . , β s n( * ) = ω + 1 (and ι s2 = . . . = ι s n( * ) = 1). So g s n( * ) is a function whose domain includes {a ∈ A 1 s1 : h 1 s1 (a) < n( * )} hence includes B. Now as M 2 |= Θ θ,R we can find c n ∈ M 2 for n < ω such that (∀b ∈ B) n g s n( * ) (b)R M2 c n and AIS player takes care that β s n( * )+1 = ω and {c n : n < ω} ⊆ A 2 s n( * )+1
. The rest should be clear.
Case 2: There is b * ∈ M 1 such that B * = {a ∈ M 1 : aR M1 b * } has cardinality > θ. Here qf({R}),θ + ,ω+1 suffice, and let B ⊆ B * be of cardinality θ + . We simulate a play in which the AIS player takes care that
We let n * be minimal such that h 1 s1 (b * ) < n * −7 and |{b ∈ B :
The rest should be clear. 3) Should be clear.
3.7
Recall
Definition 3.8. 1) A logic L is ∆-closed when : for vocabularies τ 1 ⊆ τ 2 with τ 2 \τ 1 finite, and sentences ψ, ϑ ∈ L (τ 2 ) if
2) A logic L is strongly ∆-closed when : for relational vocabularies τ 1 ⊆ τ 2 with τ 2 \τ 1 finite, unary predicate P ∈ τ 2 \τ 1 and sentences ψ, ϑ ∈ L (τ 2 ), if K 0 := {(M ↾τ 1 )↾P M : M |= ψ and P M = ∅} and K 1 := {(M ↾τ 1 )↾P M : M |= ϑ and P M = ∅} are complementary classes of τ 1 -models then some ϕ ∈ L (τ 1 ) define K 1 . 3) A logic L has dullness-elimination when : if τ 1 , τ 2 are relational vocabularies, i.e. with predicates only, τ 2 = τ 1 ∪ {P }, P a unary predicate, ψ 2 ∈ L (τ 2 ) and for
We say the logic L is ∆-closed in C for C a class of cardinals when : if in part (1) we assume just that
Proof. 1) Easy (or use the sum theorem (see 3.16) and part (2)). 2),3) Easy.
3.9
Theorem 3.10. Second Characterization Theorem
Remark 3.11. Putting together 3.4, 3.10 we get full characterization.
Proof. First L κ (τ ) and we shall find ψ ′ ∈ L (τ ) equivalent to it (it will be ϕ 1 below). By "L satisfies weak substitution" without loss of generality τ has predicates only.
We deal with and define naturally ψ So for every u ⊆ 2 µ , ψ
[Why? By clause (b) of the assumption, some ϕ ′ ∈ L (τ + ) is equivalent to ϕ where ϕ * is from ( * ) 1 . By clause (c) of the assumption some ϕ ′′ ∈ L (τ + ) is equivalent to Θ θ,R . But by clause (a) of the assumption L is a nice logic, hence (see clauses
By L being ∆-closed and having dullness-elimination (see clauses (d),(e) of the theorem's assumption) we are done.
3.10
We can note and recall Observation 3.12. 1) If the logic L satisfies interpolation then it is ∆-closed.
2) L is ∆-closed and has dullness-elimination iff L is strongly ∆-closed.
3) If L satisfies interpolation with finitely many sorts (so the interpolant mentions only the common sorts) then L is strongly ∆-closed.
4) The logic L satisfies interpolation and dullness-elimination iff L satisfies interpolation for finitely many sort models. 5) In 3.10 we can replace clauses (d),(e) by
Proof. Should be clear.
3.12
Theorem 3.13.
≤θ (τ 1 ) where θ < κ, the vocabularies τ 0 ⊆ τ 1 have cardinality ≤ θ and ∂ = θ + , µ = 2 ∂ then we can find a sequence
Proof. 1) This means that we should prove the existence of ψ ∈ L 1 κ (τ 0 ) such that ⊢ ψ 1 → ψ and ⊢ ψ → ψ 2 when we assume:
Toward contradiction we assume this fails. Without loss of generality τ ℓ (ℓ < 3) are vocabularies of cardinality < κ.
Let θ * be such that θ * < κ, θ * ≥ |τ 1 | + |τ 2 | and ψ ℓ ∈ L 1 ≤θ * for ℓ = 1, 2. For each θ ∈ [θ * , κ) as L 1 ≤θ (τ 0 ) is closed under conjunction (and conjunctions) of ≤ θ formulas and negations, clearly
α |= ¬ψ 2 and continue naturally as in the proof of 3.4. 2) Similarly.
3.13
Theorem 3.14. If κ = κ then L 1 κ satisfies the addition and product theorems, that is (all the models are τ -models for a fixed vocabulary τ ; for the sum case we assume τ has no function symbols (in particular no individual constants; or only unary functions) and the relevant models have disjoint universes):
Proof. It suffices to prove clause (c). We prove it for products. For the sums this is easier.
Clause (c) for product: Clearly it suffices to prove
; by the definition of E 1 qf(τ ),θ,α it suffices to prove for each k < k( * ) that
So we have to find a winning strategy for the ISO player for the game
The ISO player restricts itself, in the n-th move to (θ, n)-states s n for a play of
] satisfying, for some pair (s n,1 , s n,2 ), that for ℓ = 1, 2 (a) s n,ℓ is a winning n-state for the game
The rest should be clear. 3.14 * * * Remark 3.15. 1) Theorem 3.14 applies to the monadic version, too.
2) Why κ = κ ? As for any θ and α < θ + there is a sentence ψ ∈ L θ + and model M ψ of ψ of cardinality α such that any other model N of ψ can be embedded into M ψ . 3) For infinite addition, i.e. 2) For τ, θ, K as above let ψ K ∈ L 0 (2 θ ) + ,θ + (τ ) be a sentence such that for τ -models M we have: M |= ψ K iff for any A ⊆ M of cardinality θ there is h : A → ω such that for every large enough n, M ↾h −1 {n} ∈ K.
Example 4.3. Let K wo θ = {(A, < * ) :< * is a linear order of A and for some sequence U n : n < ω we have (U n , < * ↾ U n ) ∼ = (θ, <) and U n ⊆ U n+1 and A = ∪{U n : n < ω}. <θ there are α < σ and u i ∈ P for i < α such that u ⊆ ∪{u i : i < α}} for λ ≥ µ ≥ θ ≥ σ.
Concerning the upward LST theorem, the logic L 1 κ fail it badly.
Claim 4.8. There is a sentence ψ from L 1 ≤ℵ1 such that: ψ has a model of cardinality λ iff λ (ℵ 1 ) <ω 2 .
Proof. Easy, recalling 4.4(3). 4.8
Discussion 4.9. We can phrase other relatives. Also it points to the restrictions when we are looking for such logics with upward LST.
Theorem 4.10. 1) For every θ there are models M n , N n : n < ω with a fixed countable vocabulary such that M n , N n are L Proof. Let τ = {c, <}∪{F n : n < ω} where F n is a unary function, c is an individual constant and < is a binary relation.
For every α let M This clearly suffices as if Λ = ∪{Λ n : n < ω} then at least for one n, the set Λ is non-meagre (or just unbounded in ( ω ω, < J bd ω )). Why is ⊛ true? Toward contradiction assume that f is such a partial isomorphism. By the assumption for some n( * ) < ω the set {η(n( * )) : η ∈ Λ} is infinite, so chooseη = η k : k < ω such that ( * ) 0 η k (n( * )) : k < ω is strictly increasing in N n( * ) . Now: ( * ) 1 if m(1) < m(2) < ω then for every n < ω we have N n |= "F n( * ) (d n,η m(2) (n( * )) ) < F n( * ) (d n,η m(1) (n( * )) )".
